How The Germany 6th Army In Stalingard In WWII Use Mission Command

The paper is 1000 words can not be less or over the word count. Can not be in a Passive Voice and no grammar error, and no plagiarism.

APA 7 format

Title and Reference Page (word count not included)

Question: How did the actors (leaders) in the case study (see attachment) USE or FAIL to use the Army Doctrine: Mission Command and Command and Control Army Forces.

I have provided an example of how the paper should read. Please do not use it! This is someone else paper.

I have provided an outline that will help you. When writing the paper use this

What: Defines what it means

Why: Asks why was it important

How: Does it tie into the topic using examples from the case study

I have provided 2 references.

In the ADP 6-0 you find the following information

Mission Command

paragraphs 1-13 to 1-16

Principles of Mission Command (there are 7 just chose 3 to elaborate on using examples from the case study)

paragraphs 1-26 to 1-69

Command and Control

Paragraphs 1-74 to 1-90

Command and Control Warfighting Functions

Paragraph 1-95 to 1-98  (figure 1-2)

Art and science: you will have to do CTRL+F to find the meanings

 

Mission Command Case Study Analysis; Germany’s Sixth Army in Stalingrad in World War II

 

Sergeant Major Thokozani Phiri

Sergeants Major Academy

Department of Army Operations

Mr. J Gonzalez and SGM J Smith

16 November 2020

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Mission Command Case Study Analysis: Germany’s Sixth Army in Stalingrad in World War II

The Army’s command and control doctrine support its operations guidelines. It balances harmonization, personal leadership, and tactical flexibility. It emphasizes rapid decision-making and execution, including a rapid response to changing situations. It also emphasizes mutual trust and shared understanding among superiors and subordinates (Department of the Army, 2019, p. 1-3). The case study covers the analysis of Germany’s Sixth Army in Stalingrad in World War II. It illustrates how the actors used or failed to use the Army doctrine, mission command, and command and control of Army forces. The case study entails German’s Operation Barbarossa led by the German high command, Adolph Hitler, against the Soviet Union. The German Army, led by Adolph Hitler and the Soviet Union’s Red Army commanded by Stavka were the main actors. Mission command facilitates the Army’s operational concept. Therefore, the paper will provide an analysis of the actors’ actions by providing a comprehensive discussion of German and Soviet’s Armies integration of mission command and the principles, command and control, and command and control warfighting function.

Mission Command

Mission command is the Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision-making and reorganized implementation suitable to the situation. Mission command supports the Army’s operational theory of combined land operations and its importance on seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative (Department of the Army, 2019, p. 1-3). From a mission command perspective, the German and Soviet armies utilized the principles of mission command. The armies had clear commander’s intent from the beginning, with the German’s necessitating the destruction of the Soviet forces in the south, especially the Caucasus, the seizure of oil fields, and the Russians’ isolation south of the industrial city by cutting the Volga River. Contrary, the Soviet commander’s intent comprised the defense of each yard of Soviet territory. According to Rodock (2016), establishes that the commander’s intent gives Army forces a direction, whereas Storlie (2010), states that it decreases uncertainty by enhancing the shared understanding of what is required of the Army. From this viewpoint, both German’s and Soviet’s Commanders’ intent gave both armies a shared understanding of their mission orders comprising the destruction of the Red Army and defeating Soviets from the German’s side, and protecting Soviet territory from the Soviet’s side. However, while the Red Army built cohesive teams through mutual trust, disciplined initiative and competence, the German Army lacked such principles, which led to their defeat.

Mutual Trust

Mutual trust is combined confidence between Commanders, subordinates, and reliable partners and the competence in performing their assigned tasks. Leaders and subordinates give trust and built over time based on common shared experiences. Mutual trust is important to achieve mission command. Subordinates are more likely to exercise initiative when their commanders build trust in them. The subordinates become willing to exercise initiative if they believe their commander will accept and support the outcome of their decisions. Similarly, commanders delegate greater authority to subordinates who have demonstrated tactical and technical competency and whose judgment they trust (Department of the Army, 2019, p. 1-7).

Based on the case study, Stavka portrayed mutual trust in the Soviet’s subordinates by delegating operational commands to Lieutenant General Vasilis Chuikov and the staff officers. The General developed plans for a winter campaign involving two major operations, Uranus and Saturn, and the diversion Mars Operation that helped the Soviets defeat the Germans. Contrary, there was a lack of mutual trust in Germany’s Army as they constantly replaced their operational Commanders, evidenced by the dismissal of Army Group A Commander and Hitler’s adoption of the command (Showalter, 2003).

Disciplined Initiative

Disciplined initiative denotes the creativity individual subordinates have to exercise within the limits of the commander’s intent to achieve the desired end state. Disciplined initiative happens when subordinates follow the orders and abide by the plan until they realize the orders and the strategy are no longer suitable for the situation they find themselves in (Department of the Army, 2019, p. 1-12).

Stavka exercised trust over his subordinate by delegating him operational commands. Because of this delegation, Chuikov applied disciplined initiative in improving his mission order, which entailed holding back the German forces until reinforcements arrived. He adapted to battle changes and implemented tactics to neutralize the German’s firepower and obstruct the constrained maneuvering spaces required for tactical initiatives. Contrary, the Germans lacked mutual trust over their Commanders and constantly replaced them. As a result, the German troops lacked disciplined initiative and rather adhered to the commander’s intent, as depicted by their continued attempts in cutting the Volga rather than improvising, despite realizing that they were losing to the Soviets (Showalter, 2003). Additionally, the Soviets also applied competence.

Competence

The basis of effective mission command are tactically and technically competent commanders, subordinates, and teams. Commanders and subordinates attain the level of competence to accomplish given tasks to standard through training, task understanding, and professional development. Commanders continually assess the competence of their subordinates and their organizations. The assessment tells the degree of trust commanders have in their subordinates’ capability to perform mission orders in a reorganized manner at acceptable levels of risk (Department of the Army, 2019, p. 1-7). According to Ruddock (2016), and the Deployable Training Division (2020), states that mission command enables decisiveness, agility, and speed at the tactical level. From this perspective, the Soviet’s mission command promoted decisiveness during the battle, shown by Chuikov’s competence in decision-making skills and fast adaptation to battle changes.

According to Showalter (2003), explained that when the battle tempo was high with the threat of army firing squads and the secret police’s pistols keeping his men on the line, Chuikov used his knowledge of the German tactics of complex combined-arms attacks and that of the terrain. Chuikov used this knowledge to gain a tactical advantage in the battle. As a result, rather than simply sitting back and waiting for the Germans to thrash him, Chuikov ordered his troops to grab them by the belt and engage them as closely as possible, to fight not merely street by street and building by building, but floor by floor and room-by-room. This shows the Soviet’s decisiveness, speed, and agility during the battle, which proves their knowledge and competence of the Army Doctrine. On the other hand, the German Army lacked competent leaders. The army’s rapid expansion since Hitler’s seizure of power in 1933 had left it so short of qualified staff officers that everybody immersed in details to have energy left for evaluating the big picture (Showalter, 2003). The Soviet’s defeat of the Germans shows adherence of the mission command principles, presenting their use of the Army doctrine as well as command and control.

Command and Control

Command and control is necessary to all operations. It is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces to accomplish a mission. Command is the authority that a Commander lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. It is more of art than science because it incorporates indirect elements that require judgment in application. The elements of command are authority, responsibility, decision-making, and leadership. Control is the regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander’s intent. It is more of science than art because it relies on objectivity, practical methods, and analysis. The key elements of control are direction, feedback, information and communication (Department of the Army, 2019, pp. 1-17, 1-18). The application of the art of command and science of control result in achieving mission command and control.

The Art and Science of Command and Control

The art and science of command and control involve the creative and skillful exercise of authority through timely decision-making and leadership. Commanders, with support of their staffs, combine the art of command and control and the science of command and control to understand situations, make decisions, direct actions, and lead forces toward mission execution (Department of the Army, 2019, p. 2-1). Besides adhering to mission command principles, the Soviet Army’s balance of art of command with the science of control also signifies their use of the Army doctrine. Concerning the art of command, the Soviets employed decision-making, leadership, and authority in defeating the German Army.

Chuikov’s use of command and control authority shows the Soviets understanding of this doctrine as evidenced in the statement, Chuikov employed personal authority. According to Showalter (2003), stated that in one of modern history’s great examples of leadership, Chuikov kept his men fighting by the force of his character. He offered no rhetoric and made no promises. Instead, he projected a dour fatalism that linked the city’s fate and its garrison in the empowerment of the forces to keep fighting despite having few resources. Contrary, Adolf Hitler and his Commanders relied on official authority and the Commanders’ skills in the battle. He was compelled to substitute courage for skill and lives for maneuver; however, Stalingrad’s German army was diminishing. Consequently, the Germans lost skilled and competent leaders during the war, thus decreasing their success chances.

Similarly, to the art of command, from the science of control perspective, the Soviets demonstrated a more superior understanding of Army doctrine, as depicted by their leveraging of information, structure, degree of control, and communication components during the battle. The Soviets had a better understanding of the German Army’s battle tactics, as shown by the statement, “Chuikov, as a matter of fact, a man as ever wore a uniform, talked about an inexplicable force driving the Germans forward. It was, however, merely a last brilliant flash of the fighting power, skill, and spirit that had taken the Wehrmacht across Western Europe, North Africa, and into the heart of Russia” (Showalter, 2003). This understanding of Nazi Germany’s unified armed forces battle tactics enabled Chuikov to counterattack and fight the Sixth Army to a standstill. Moreover, they also integrated command and control warfighting function.

Command and Control Warfighting Function

The command and control warfighting function is the related tasks and a system that empower commanders to coordinate and unite all components of combat power. The main purpose of the command and control warfighting function is to assist commanders in incorporating the other elements of combat power which are; movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, protection, information and leadership to attain objectives and accomplish missions (Department of the Army, 2019, p.1-19).

According to Showalter (2003), stated that the Soviets had a better organization, intelligence, and communication between its forces than the Germans, which enabled the Army to receive reinforcements at the right time hence empowering them to fight back. Besides, the Soviets also portrayed a better degree of control in comparison to the Germans. Specifically, the case study focuses on Chuikov’s’ actions, who was acting on behalf of Stavka. In contrast, on the German side, Hitler was involved in controlling all the battle aspects rather than delegating his subordinates’ tactical and operational aspects. Moreover, the Soviets had a fixed structure comprising Stalin as the Soviet leader, Stavka as the high Commander, Zhukov as the second in command, and other tactical Commanders such as Chuikov. This established structure eased the Commanders’ process of exercising control. Contrary, the Germans lacked a proper structure due to the displacement and replacement of the Commanders, as depicted in the statement, “Many of the key figures of Operation Barbarossa, such as Heinz Guderian, Gerd von Rundstedt, and Fedor von Bock, were relieved of command or transferred” (Showalter, 2003). Additionally, the Germans experienced an intelligence failure, as they did not consider the terrain and the Russian residents’ determination to protect their homes and support Stalin in resisting invaders, underestimation of Russia’s resources, and underestimating Soviets in general.

Conclusion

Mission command, command and control, and the command and control warfighting function describes how the staffs support their commanders. It also illustrates how the combination of art and science of command and control helps to understand situations, make decisions, direct actions, and lead forces toward mission accomplishment. The case study concludes that both German and Soviet Armies used Army doctrine during their battle in World War II. However, while the Soviets utilized both the principles of mission command and balanced the art of command with the science of control coupled with the war fighting function, the Germans failed to do likewise, hence their defeat.

 

 

 

References

Department of the Army, (2019). Mission command, command and control of army forces.

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN19189_ADP_6-0_FINAL_WEB_v2.pdf

Deployable Training Division, (2020). Mission Command, deployable training division. Joint Staff J7. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/fp/missioncommand_fp_2nd_ed.pdf?ver=2020-01-13-083451-207

Rodock, R. (2016). The benefits of mission command, balance of philosophy and system, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Army Command and General Staff College.

https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1022244.pdf

Showalter, D. (2003). Germany’s sixth army in Stalingrad in World War II. World War II Magazine, January 2003 issue.

Storlie, C. (2010). Manage uncertainty with commander’s intent.

https://hbr.org/2010/11/dont-play-golf-in-a-football-g